TAREA 1

Intergenerational Mobility

Read the article about the long-term decline in intergenerational mobility in the United States since the 1850s. Choose the best answer (a, b, or c) for each question. Question 0 has been done as an example. Write your final answers on the answer sheet. (9x1=9 points)

Long-term Decline in Intergenerational Mobility in the United States since the 1850s

Intergenerational social mobility, or simply "mobility," refers to the extent of difference (or, conversely, similarity) in social status between parents and offspring. Social mobility has been a persistent theme throughout US history, reflecting Americans' collective belief in their country being a "land of opportunity," a society that provides equal opportunities for individuals from poor and rich families alike. While this belief is widely held among the public, little is known about how mobility opportunities and outcomes have changed over time. Compared to the well-established knowledge of historical levels of economic inequality, evidence of long-term trends in intergenerational mobility is largely absent. Most studies hitherto have relied on data from a small set of cities or from 2 snapshots in time, both of which limit the generalizability of their findings. Prior research has also used different measures of social status, such as education, occupation, income, or wealth, or even indirect status indicators based on individuals' names. Inconsistency across these studies has prevented researchers extending their findings to a broader historical spectrum.

The present study provides long-term intergenerational mobility trends based on a consistent, occupation-based measure from 1850 to 2015 using data drawn from linked US population and household administrative records. In recent years, social scientists and policy makers have voiced concern that rising economic inequality may have led to declines in social mobility. However, after decades of research, the link between the 2 is still unclear. On the one hand, cross-country comparisons suggest a negative relationship between income inequality and intergenerational mobility—a higher correlation between offspring's earnings and that of their parents in countries with higher Gini coefficients than in those with lower inequality. On the other hand, research on the United States has revealed constancy in intergenerational persistence of income and occupational status since the 1970s, an era when economic inequality has substantially increased. Hence, there is a real need to establish the empirical pattern of long-term mobility before we can accept or reject claims about its causes and consequences.

Our long-term mobility analysis relies on data pertaining to more than 5 million Americans linked to their parents using occupational measures and statistical methods that are consistent over time. The data include father–son dyads from linked full-count federal population censuses spanning 1850–1880, 1880–1910, and 1910–1940, and from the Current Population Survey 1973–1990 linked to both the 1940 and 2000 censuses and the 2001–2015 American Community Surveys (ACSs). For cross-validation purposes, we supplement the analysis with well-established mobility data from 11 large-scale cross-sectional and longitudinal social surveys. To address data limitations in previous research,

we pool multiple data sources to create nationally representative
samples of white males born in the United States in 16 consecutive 10-y cohorts between 1830 and 1980.

We accomplish 3 interrelated objectives in this paper. First, we estimate the overall trend in intergenerational mobility based on the correlation between parents' and offspring's occupational percentile ranks. Unlike some widely used occupational indices, such as the Duncan socioeconomic index score, the relative statuses of the same occupations have necessarily changed over time as the overall occupational structure changed. For example, as we will show, the percentile ranks of clerical workers declined when professional, managerial, and executive jobs at the top end of the occupational distribution expanded. As a result, a clerical worker's relative standing in his birth cohort would have decreased even when his father had also been a clerical worker. Second, we consider how the mobility trends were affected by rapid industrialization in the second half of the 19th century and examine how our observed trend is sensitive to the exclusion of mobility from farm to nonfarm jobs. Finally, we measure changes in absolute mobility—including both upward mobility and downward mobility—using the rank-ordered scale of occupations. Among the 70 microclass occupations analyzed in the present study, we estimate the fractions of children in each birth cohort whose occupational ranks are above, below, or approximately the same as those of their fathers. We use occupational ranks rather than percentile ranks to measure absolute mobility because the former captures moving up or down the social ladder, whereas the latter is confounded by "involuntary mobility" caused by changing marginal distributions of occupations.

Example 0. Social mobility…
   a. has been a marker of the relationship between parents and children.
   b. *is part of the American ideology of the self-made man.*
   c. reflects the differences between the rich and the poor.

1. Previous studies of intergenerational mobility...
   a. have been inconclusive and insufficient.
   b. didn't take into account the right demographics.
   c. didn't have the right tools to make general conclusions.

2. Social scientists and policy makers fear that economic inequality …
   a. affects social mobility directly.
   b. has not been taken into consideration in previous studies.
   c. could have an impact on social mobility.

3. Comparing other countries there is a trend where children _____ end up earning a similar amount to that of their parents.
   a. in every place under study

b. from places with more inequality
c. from places with less inequality

4. Cross-country comparisons and research in the United States_____ before thinking about causes and consequences.
   a. prove that there is no need to identify a long-term mobility pattern
   b. show that it is necessary to identify a long-term mobility pattern
   c. make it logical to jump to long-term mobility conclusions

5. This long-term mobility analysis…
   a. included the familial relationships since 1850 uninterrupted.
   b. has been carried out taking only male offspring into account.
   c. uses the census of specific states in different time periods.

6. To make up for the deficiencies of previous research.
   a. this study includes more reliable data sources.
   b. a series of data sources have been combined.
   c. they used samples of white males from 1830 and 1980.

7. In the first objective…
   a. the evolution in the way particular jobs are remunerated is studied.
   b. a specific moment in time is used to generalize about mobility.
   c. clerical and executive jobs are compared more accurately.

8. The second achieved objective…
   a. uses industrialization to show a change from farm to non-farm jobs.
   b. observes how industrialization shifted the trend under analysis.
   c. compares intergenerational mobility between farm and non-farm jobs.

9. Changes in absolute mobility…
   a. are better measured by occupational ranks than by percentile ranks.
   b. cannot be measured by either occupational ranks or percentile ranks.
   c. are ignored when only percentile ranks are used for measuring.

TAREA 2

Gentrification

Read the following article and choose the correct statement from the list for each of the blanks. There are two statements that you do not need to use. Item 0 has been done as an example. Write your final answers on the answer sheet. (9x1=9 points)

San Francisco Most Intensely Gentrified City In New Rankings

San Francisco was the most intensely gentrified city in America from 2013 to 2017, a new study found.

(0)_____C_____. They had the largest share of their vulnerable neighborhoods that gentrified during that time period.

The Study, from the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, (1)_____, in which Washington, DC, was the most gentrified city in the nation from 2000-2013. In the 2020 report, DC dropped to No. 13. Gentrification continued there, but it surged elsewhere.

NCRC identified 954 neighborhoods with indications of gentrification in the period 2013-2017. The vast majority of these neighborhoods came from just 20 cities, (2)_____. Nationally, half of all of the gentrifying neighborhoods were in these 20 cities.

NCRC once again found that gentrification remained a significant threat to minority and LMI families in some of the largest and most prosperous parts of the country. These cities are home to over 14% of all Americans.

Cultural displacement, (3)_____, is likely occurring in these communities as well. The 2020 U.S. Census will allow NCRC to measure this displacement. That data is expected to be available by 2022.

Throughout the rest of the country the community and personal challenges of chronic disinvestment and poverty, rather than growth and displacement, was common throughout nearly all LMI neighborhoods. In most of the country, (4)_____.

"Some cities were booming, (5)_____, but in most of the country, lower-income residents and neighborhoods suffered from a lack of investment, stagnant economies and fewer opportunities to accumulate personal wealth," said Jason Richardson, NCRC director of research and evaluation, and one of the lead authors of the report.

The study also investigated the newly-created Opportunity Zones (OZs), where the 2017 tax overhaul offered investors new tax breaks. Opportunity Zones (6)_____. NCRC found that neighborhoods designated as OZs were indeed the places in the most dire need of investment. Perhaps not surprising, there was a close association between neighborhoods that gentrified and where OZs were located. Sixty-nine percent of neighborhoods (7)_____. Overall though, neighborhoods designated as OZs far outnumbered those neighborhoods where gentrification was found.

As of now, (8)_____, they are having on the areas included in this study. A general lack of transparency permeates the Opportunity Zone program.

"We cannot tell who is investing, where the money is going or what kinds of projects are being funded. Four months into the COVID-19 pandemic, (9) _____. In that case, the question has shifted from 'who is investing in Opportunity Zones?' to a more fundamental 'who has anything to invest in Opportunity Zones?'" Richardson said.

San Francisco Most Intensely Gentrified City In New Rankings. National Community Reinvestment Coalition
https://ncrc.org/san-francisco-most-intensely-gentrified-city-in-new-rankings/ June 17th, 2020

A	where each had at least ten neighborhoods gentrified during the 2013-2017 period
B	and that created unique and difficult challenges for longtime residents who were priced out and pushed out
C	*It was followed by Denver, Boston, Miami and New Orleans*
D	so little is known about investment in Opportunity Zones that it is difficult to tell what impact, if any
E	allow investors that have capital gains from the sale of other property to invest them for tax purposes
F	an indicator of the study's final findings in opposition with previous results
G	we can assume that many of the capital gains that investors would have invested there might not exist
H	is a follow-up to the organization's 2019 gentrification and displacement rankings
I	high levels of inequality as well as low home values and incomes prevented families from building wealth at all
J	experiencing gentrification from 2013-2017 were either in or adjacent to an OZ
K	the process where gentrification encourages a change in the social and racial composition of the population
L	under the impression of being misplaced because of lack of representation in the analysis and its findings

TAREA 3

Racism

Read the text about racism. Choose the best option (a, b, or c) for each blank. Item 0 has been done as an example. Write your final answers on the answer sheet. (9x1=9 points)

Why I'm no longer talking to White People About Race

"I'm no longer engaging with white people on the topic of race. Not all white people, just the vast majority who refuse to accept the existence of structural racism and its symptoms. I can no longer engage with the gulf of an emotional disconnect that white people display when a person of colour articulates their experience. You can see their eyes shut down and harden. It's like treacle is poured into their ears, blocking up their ear canals. It's like they can no longer hear us.

"This emotional disconnect is the conclusion of living a life oblivious to the fact that their skin colour is the norm and all others (0) ___*c*___ from it.

"At best, white people have been taught not to mention that people of colour are "different" in case it offends us. They truly believe that the experiences of their life as a result of their skin colour can and should be universal. I just can't engage with the bewilderment and the defensiveness as they try to (1) _____ with the fact that not everyone experiences the world in the way that they do.

"They've never had to think about what it means, in power terms, to be white, so any time they're vaguely reminded of this fact they interpret it as an affront. Their eyes (2) _____ over in boredom or widen in indignation. Their mouths start twitching as they get defensive. Their throats open up as they try to interrupt, (3) _____ to talk over you but not to really listen, because they need to let you know that you've got it wrong.

"The journey towards understanding structural racism still requires people of colour to prioritise white feelings. Even if they can hear you, they're not really listening. It's like something happens to the words as they leave our mouths and reach their ears. The words hit a barrier of (4) _____ and they don't get any further.

"That's the emotional disconnect. It's not really surprising, because they've never known what it means to (5) _____ a person of colour as a true equal, with thoughts and feelings that are as valid as their own. Watching [the documentary] The Color of Fear by Lee Mun Wah, I saw people of colour break down in tears as they struggled to convince a defiant white man that his words were enforcing and (6) _____ a white racist standard on them. All the while he stared obliviously, completely confused by this pain, at best trivialising it, at worst ridiculing it.

"I've written before about this white denial being the ubiquitous politics of race that operates on its (7) _____ invisibility. So I can't talk to white people about race any more because of the consequent denials, awkward cartwheels and mental acrobatics that they display when

this is brought to their attention. Who really wants to be alerted to a structural system that benefits them at the (8) _____ of others?

"I can no longer have this conversation, because we're often coming at it from completely different places. I can't have a conversation with them about the details of a problem if they don't even recognise that the problem exists. Worse still is the white person who might be willing to (9) _____ the possibility of said racism, but who thinks we enter this conversation as equals. We don't.

Extract from Why I'm no longer talking to White People About Race . Reni Eddo-Lodge
Published on February 2014 http://renieddolodge.co.uk/why-im-no-longer-talking-to-white-people-about-race/

0.	a) separate	b) derive	c) *deviate*
1.	a) grapple	b) understand	c) neglect
2.	a) glaze	b) peer	c) point
3.	a) tentatively	b) itching	c) shyly
4.	a) bewilderment	b) acceptance	c) denial
5.	a) embrace	b) tolerate	c) announce
6.	a) uncovering	b) perpetuating	c) planting
7.	a) surprising	b) inherent	c) conditioned
8.	a) benefit	b) sacrifice	c) expense
9.	a) outgrow	b) condemn	c) entertain

1. CLAVE DE CORRECCIONES

Task 1: Intergenerational mobility

Question	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Total
Answer	b	a	c	c	b	b	b	c	b	a	(9)

Task 2: Gentrification

Question	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Total
Answer	C	H	A	K	I	B	E	J	D	G	(9)

EXTRAS F, L.

Task 3: Racism

Question	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Total
Answer	c	a	a	b	a	b	b	c	c	(9)

2. TABLA DE CONVERSIÓN

1	2	3	4	5			8	9	10	11	12	13	
0,4	0,7	1,1	1,5	1,	2,	2,6	3	3,3	3,7	4,1	4,4	4,8	
14	15	16	17	8	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
5,2	5,6	5,9	6,	6,7	7	7,4	7,8	8,1	8,5	8,9	9,3	9,6	10

8